Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
ETD Archive
2015

High Speed Clock Glitching
Santosh Desiraju
Cleveland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Desiraju, Santosh, "High Speed Clock Glitching" (2015). ETD Archive. 788.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/788

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in ETD Archive by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information,
please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

HIGH SPEED CLOCK GLITCHING

SANTOSH DESIRAJU

Bachelor of Science in Electronics and
Communication Engineering
Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada

July, 2012

submitted in
partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the

MASTERS OF SCIENCE IN ELECTRICAL
ENGINEERING
at the

CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2015

We hereby approve this thesis
For
Santosh Desiraju
(Student’s Name)

Candidate for the Electrical Engineering degree
for the Department of
ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING
And
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY’S

College of Graduate Studies by

Thesis Committee Chairperson, Dr. Chansu Yu

Department & Date

Dr. Pong Chu

Department & Date

Dr. Sanchita Mal-Sarkar

Department & Date

Dr. Swarup Bhunia

Department & Date

02/11/2015
Student’s Date of Defense

Dedicated to Amma, Nanna and Mohana

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following individuals have not just assisted me in the development of this thesis
but have molded my ability to carry out research work and tackle problems with the best
possible methodology. Firstly, I thank Dr. Chansu Yu who provided me support and the
research path for this work and introduced me to projects which helped in my professional
development. I would like to thank Dr. Pong Chu and Dr. Sanchita Mal-Sarkar for
serving on my thesis committee.
I thank the entire team at Riscure North America for giving me the opportunity
to carry out the research in their facility. To begin with, Robert Van Spyk has been
immensely helpful and patient in providing directions and getting experiments working.
I thank Rajesh Velegalati for his smart assistance in dealing with design problems. I
thank Jasper van Woudenberg for timely assessment and wonderful ideas to develop
this research path. I thank Cees-Bart Breunesse for all the useful suggestions and tasty
lunches during my time at the office. I thank Alexandria Parkinson for all the official
work and shopping for the equipment required for the project. I would also like to thank
all the individuals from whom I have sought their opinion and help.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their invaluable suggestions
and encouragement to experience the best in my time in San Francisco as well as
Cleveland.
Thanks,
Santosh
February 11th, 2015

HIGH SPEED CLOCK GLITCHING

SANTOSH DESIRAJU

ABSTRACT
In recent times, hardware security has drawn lot of interest in the research community.
With physical proximity to the target devices, various fault injection hardware attack
methods have been proposed and tested to alter their functionality and trigger behavior not
intended by the design. There are various types of faults that can be injected depending
on the parameters being used and the level at which the device is tampered with. The
literature describes various fault models to inject faults in clock of the target but there
are no publications on overclocking circuits for fault injection. The proposed method
bridges this gap by conducting high-speed clock fault injection on latest high-speed
micro-controller units where the target device is overclocked for a short duration in the
range of 4-1000 ns.
This thesis proposes a method of generating a high-speed clock and driving the
target device using the same clock. The properties of the target devices for performing
experiments in this research are: Externally accessible clock input line and GPIO line.
The proposed method is to develop a high-speed clock using custom bit-stream sent to
FPGA and subsequently using external analog circuitry to generate a clock-glitch which
can inject fault on the target micro-controller. Communication coupled with glitching
allows us to check the target’s response, which can result in information disclosure.
This is a form of non-invasive and effective hardware attack. The required background, methodology and experimental setup required to implement high-speed clock
glitching has been discussed in this thesis. The impact of different overclock frequencies
used in clock fault injection is explored. The preliminary results have been discussed and
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we show that even high-speed micro-controller units should consider countermeasures
against clock fault injection.
Influencing the execution of Tiva C Launchpad and STM32F4 micro-controller units
has been shown in this thesis. The thesis details the method used for the testing and
the parameters used in the process are included. The implementation and design of the
clock-glitch prototype system on the FPGA-clock jitter cleaner platform is discussed in
this research. Glitching the execution of high-frequency targets is the goal of this
project.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the scope of this research is discussed in section 1.1. Further, the
motivation and the research question has been established in sections 1.2 and 1.3,
respectively. Section 1.4 describes the proposed research work of this thesis. Finally, the
organization of the thesis is outlined in section 1.5.

1.1 Scope

For computing devices to be secure, both the hardware and software has to be
secure. Since software builds up on hardware, ensuring and verifying that hardware
does not have any weaknesses is of utmost importance in present day scenarios. The
different categories involved in security research include injection or attack, detection,
and prevention [33]. Further classifying the attack area of research, there are two main
sub-categories: side-channel attacks, and, more important to this study, fault injection
attacks. Fault injection can be performed in several ways, but there are two main types
of fault injection. The types of attack are software and hardware fault injection [30].
Hardware fault injection is an expensive way of determining the robustness of the
system. This is because hardware attacks require additional equipment to generate or
replicate the source of the attack. Attackers interested in hardware fault injection utilize
various intrinsic parameters of the target device and make changes in them via internal
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modification, for example voltage and clock, or via external perturbation, such as laser
fault injection to test the device’s response.
This thesis introduces a novel way of implementing high-speed clock glitches which
is an important type of fault injection. This type of fault injection is a non-invasive type
of attack in the purview that the attack does not attempt to alter the internal structure of
the chip. The research conducted during this thesis implements a high-speed clock fault
injection tool. This fault injection tool is designed to accommodate a high-degree of
customization to cater to the required setting and target at hand. The underlying principle
is overclock mode, which temporarily switches to a higher frequency. In other words,
glitches were generated through a method of overclocking to a higher frequency and
returning the clock to the normal frequency after a short duration. Clock glitch parameters
have been varied to observe the impact on the target’s execution. By controlling these
parameters, the observable effects on the output of the targets has been shown.
The scope of the research is limited to overclocking the base clock for a short duration.
This requires switching to a high frequency clock for a duration in the range of 4-1000ns
and then returning to normal base clock frequency operation. The base clock and the
high frequency clock are provided via external source to the target device. The focus of
the research is on the parameters of the perturbation which causes impact on the target.

1.2 Motivation
With the advent of micro-controllers and embedded processors in consumer electronics, the ability to test them to meet certain standards of security is of prime importance.
Various types of attacks have to be tried and tested which will indirectly result in the
development of secure hardware in the future.
The utilization of a high-speed clock in digital electronics has become more prevalent in recent times. Also, overclocking these devices to squeeze out the maximum
performance has also been existent. But, to make any feasible impact on this clock
line using external circuitry requires generating a high-speed clock and making minor
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changes in the default parameters at which the system runs. Possible ways have been
investigated for creating a setup which can deliver a configurable clock frequency to
match the requirement of the target system. The research related to this thesis has been
carried out during my internship at Riscure North America R&D laboratory. The main
interest in this research is to extend an internal, unpublished project previously performed
at Riscure North America R&D laboratory which successfully overclocked using custom
FPGA bit-streams. Existing research on hardware attacks also do not provide an in-depth
explanation on the setup and equipment used to present their results. Existing results
depict the outcomes of clock glitching on micro-controllers or smart cards and other
similar hardware but not on very high speed clock glitching. This thesis bridges this gap
by describing the experimental setup involved in creating high-speed clock glitches.

1.3 Research Question
The challenge posed by this research is to find a method to introduce faults to the
system while maintaining the original functionality it was designed for without making
any observable modifications to the generated results. The main research goal is to
show that high speed clock glitches, greater than 150 MHz, are feasible. Ideally, the
aim is to observe clock fault injection on a cryptographic algorithm or simple counter
algorithm running on latest micro-controllers. The selected cryptographic algorithm
for the experiments performed in this thesis is RSA-CRT. Another goal of this work is
to develop the clock fault injection setup which has the capability to overclock up to a
~1GHz. This goal has been set keeping in mind the present-day high-speed electronic
devices which might have built-in security features and also can be the subject for
clock fault injection. The time duration for this overclock is in the range of 4-1000ns.
Chip manufacturers usually have economic trade-offs during design stage for adding
either security features or other latest features. The parameters and configuration of the
system at which the correct observation mentioned above can be detected restates the
susceptibility of the target.
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1.4 Proposed Work
This thesis proposes a high-speed clock glitch fault injection technique, which injects
a clock glitch in the clock line of a target system/device. This technique utilizes mainly
the external clock input of the target device. In this thesis, the required background,
methodology and setup to perform clock glitching has been described. Implementation
of a Clock Fault Injection tool requires integration with a software package that can
monitor the output and log results. The impact of different ranges of clock frequencies
between which the switch takes place to attack the target, has been observed. Microcontroller boards which run on a clock frequency higher than 100MHz were selected and
programmed to implement cryptographic operations: RSA-CRT. These targets have been
selected in such a way that the clock lines can be externally supplied. This feature would
enable the target board to be customized to work in bypass mode, where the internal
Phase Locked Loop circuitry of the micro-controller clock tree can be bypassed.
This thesis also illustrates a prototype system to implement the glitch on the target.
The glitch can be generated by using either on-chip or external measures. Evaluation
of the effective method of generation of a high-frequency clock would be the ultimate
task. A novel idea for the implementation of high-speed clocks is by using a clock
multiplier which is configurable in real-time. Firstly, a prototype which implements
the reconfigurable high-speed clock generation has been designed. The steps involved
are: generating a clock from the FPGA at the required voltage level which can be set
as input for the clock multiplier. The clock multiplier then produced multiple clock
outputs at the required frequency. In this thesis, fault injection experiments have been
performed on TM4C123GH6PM micro-controller manufactured by Texas Instruments
and STM32F417IG micro-controller manufactured by STMicroelectronics.

1.5 Organization
The remaining chapters of the thesis are structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides
the required background of the existing methodologies and tools involved in hardware
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attacks. Chapter 3 is the literature review of related works in the fault injection, clock
glitching, and hardware security research. Chapter 4 details the proposed high speed
clock glitching technique by explaining about the equipment used and analyzes the
operation details of the clock glitcher module system on the Tiva C Series Launchpad
(TM4C MCU) and Core 417I Development Board (STM32F MCU) micro-controllers.
Chapter 5 evaluates and elaborates on the performance of the glitching prototype system
on both targets. Finally, Chapter 6 gives a summary of the thesis and provides a base
for potential future work using high-speed clock glitching. Samples of the applications
running on the targets and other relevant observations made during experimentation are
given in the Appendix Section.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF STUDY

The first hardware attack was carried out in the 1970s [15]. The scientific community
identified that hardware attacks could be used as a method of maliciously influencing
a target system during the late 1990s. In devices which implement cryptographic
algorithms, injecting variations in parameters like time duration, power consumption,
electromagnetic radiation etc., secret data is more likely to be leaked. Later on with
further analysis, it became well understood that faults are induced in a device by unusual
conditions of the close, physical environment of the cryptographic implementation.
This chapter presents the required background information about hardware attacks. A
brief description of types of hardware attacks has been provided in section 2.1. Types of
fault injection attacks is introduced in section 2.2. Section 2.3 focuses on clock glitching.
Section 2.4 describes an example condition illustrating the theory in section 2.3.

2.1 General description of hardware attack
In this section classification of hardware attacks have been discussed. Figure 2.1
shows the basic classification of hardware attacks. Sensitive information like pin codes in
banking cards, ATM(debit cards), credit cards, subscriber identity in SIM-cards etc. are
stored in secure micro-controllers [46]. Attackers can subvert these secure mechanisms
in multiple ways. These attacks are generally categorized as active or passive. Active
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attacks are those in which the attacker alters the normal functionality of the target device.
An attacker can inject faults into the device and obtain results which carry sensitive
information. Whereas passive attacks work under normal conditions trying to find out
the sensitive information. Passive attacks do not involve device tampering. Observing
certain properties which the device exhibits can lead to results which have to be analyzed
to get the required information.

Figure 2.1: Classification of hardware attacks [37]
By these above mentioned types of hardware attacks and also from the classification
in the Figure 2.1, security measures and sensitive information are prone to threats such
as the following [9], [39]:
• Fault Injection attacks – Generating malfunction in the target device to cause error
or break the security of the device. The main types of fault injection attacks are
described in 2.2. The main theme of the research conducted in this thesis is this
category of hardware attacks [14].
• Side Channel attacks/Eavesdropping – Side-channel information which includes
time duration for certain operations, power consumed during execution of the
program, electromagnetic radiation properties are observed and specific attacks
are designed which manipulate these properties [17].
• Reverse Engineering - Most of the products which are available in the market
are designed by making use of components provided with documentation by
manufacturers. Hence, attackers can design specific methods to reach their goal,
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which can be either security-breach or for research-purposes. The main methods
involved are analysis of hardware used and reconstruction. Specific components
for each product, which do not include documentation are not usually manufactured
and made available in the markets since it involves huge costs [36].
• Micro probing – These include Focused Ion Beam (FIB) attacks to gain indepth perception of the complex interconnections on the chip [29]. Invasive
attacks start with the removal of the chip package. Once the chip is opened, it
is possible to perform probing or modification attacks. Accessing the chip
surface directly results in obtaining information regarding the software used which
leads to devising mechanisms to tamper with inferred security systems. These
attacks can be repeated several times with the basic setup system which can be
procured once and it can be configured to suit the target platform.

2.2 Types of Fault Injection attacks
There are various types of Fault based Injection attacks depending on the type of
parameter being used in the attack or the level at which the device is tampered. Faults
which are induced into the target devices help in maliciously exploiting the error which
has been found or on the other hand to test the device dependability. Present day devices
are expected to function normally even under the presence of faults or even extreme
conditions. Most manufacturers do not provide the public with the measures which
have been used for the design of the device which the consumers end up using. Hence,
subjecting these devices to fault injection has been the main direction of thought to
understand the device rigidness.
Primarily, there are two different types of faults: transient faults and intermittent
faults [50]. The authors of [50] have compared the effects of these two types of faults.
The occurrence of transient faults is comparatively more frequent in present day microprocessors. Fault injection attacks manipulate transient faults in the chips during execu-
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tion of various processes.
In integrated circuit (IC) electronics, faults are actuated by fault injection. Fault
injection trigger mechanisms include glitches on the clock signal, voltage and photo-electric effects which are caused by lasers or white light. Generally fault injection by laser is
more expensive compared to clock signal or voltage glitch. Another aspect where these
methods vary is the area they affect. Clock signal or voltage glitch affects the entire chip,
whereas laser only allows stimulating specific regions of a chip [11].
Fault Injection attacks can further be classified as non-invasive, semi-invasive or
fully invasive [14] which are briefly explained in this section:
• Non-invasive attacks: These types of attacks involve bus snooping and pin-probing.
The equipment required to perform these types of attacks requires tools such as
oscilloscopes and probing stations. Pertinent knowledge relating both hardware
and software stack is required in this case. As the attacks can make the CPU
execute different instructions than what it is intended for. These types of attacks
can sometimes be subverted by the usage of hardware sensors and secure coding
mechanisms [2].
• Invasive attacks: These types of attacks involve depackaging of chip and may
sometimes include removing of the passivation layer [16]. This will subsequently
lead to observing the internal circuitry by micro-probing and eventually plant
changes in them. The equipment required to perform these types of attacks is
expensive and requires formal training. The targets are usually custom-made
ASICs.
• Semi-invasive attacks: This is the bridge between the two types of attacks discussed
above. It involves decapsulation of the chip. This step provides access to the surface
of the chip. Removal of the passivation layer as mentioned in the previous method
is not required. The best example for this type of attack is Optical fault injection.
Several observations have been made by the authors of [41] on the impact of fault
injection via various parameters.
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The following is a list of semi-invasive attacks which are more valuable in generating
research potential as the target does not get affected during these attacks [41]. The most
common types of semi-invasive fault injection attack methods are listed below:
• Clock glitching: Here, fault is injected by sudden increase in the clock frequency.
The device clock is accelerated by one or multiple pulses for a short period of
time in the external clock provided to the target. This introduces fault in the
execution of instructions. This may introduce instability to the system and the
current instruction may not be executed or executed incorrectly [34].
• Voltage glitching: In this method, faults are injected by sudden changes in the
supply voltage [21]. This might result in incorrect values to be read from memory
or program flow might get damaged. Standard power is required for reading and
writing values to memory. Fluctuations in power during these operations lead to
wrong values being read or written.
• Optical glitching: A light beam is used to inject fault into hardware devices. It is
also known as Laser fault injection. It is possible to switch the state of transistors
as they are inherently sensitive to light by exposing them to an optical pulse. A
focused laser beam can be used to accurately target specific regions of the chip [46].
Radiation fault injection is a type of optical glitching. Different type of light
beams like X-Rays, Gamma Rays Visible/UV/IR light etc. are used to inject faults
targeting a minor region of the devices.
• EM glitching: Electromagnetic Fault Injection is based on introducing fault into
the target with a magnetic flux [49]. This type of attack is difficult to detect during
run-time. The equipment cost for the setup used here is comparatively lower than
optical fault injection.
As shown in Figure2.2, observations have been made categorically between Semiinvasive and Non-invasive attacks. Further research is on the way towards implementing
a combination of different types of attack methods. Lack of control during the execution
of these fault injections using certain parameters other than clock has been observed.
10

Clock glitching has been preferred due to ease of control and temporary effect on the
target device [46]. Finally, as manufacturers are aware of fault injection threats to secure
devices, various countermeasures are implemented to mitigate the risk posed by them.

2.3 Clock Glitching
Modern microprocessor and ICs are made up of millions of transistors which function
synchronously or asynchronously and change states based on every clock cycle. Fault
Injection using clock parameter is the process of actively attacking or influencing a
device’s clock to make it malfunction or to generate results which deviate from the
normal. So, during this attack process few or more gates switch incorrectly and also
might enter into an unknown state. The primary goal of clock glitching is to corrupt the
system in order to bypass the security measures and access secret information.

Individual components on a micro-controller system which include CPU, RAM,
GPIO pins and other peripherals are all synchronized to a global clock line. A clock
glitch is a sudden rise in the clock frequency for a short period as shown in Figure 2.3.
Typically, the maximum frequency is set by the manufacturer depending on the properties
of individual components such as transistor gate length and internal clock distribution.
At a given voltage and temperature: maximum clock frequency is directly proportional
to maximum delay among its internal elements. The maximum frequency given by the
manufacturer is the frequency it takes to reach all registers. A reliable frequency assures
that the clock signal goes to every component properly. If there is any sudden glitch in
this frequency, the system becomes unstable and operates abnormally.
Forcing the IC to work beyond its design parameters for a particular period would
prevent instructions from executing correctly in that period. Once the clock frequency is
back to normal, the execution of further instructions continues. The author in [20] talks
about integrated circuits like micro-controllers where pipe-lining is used. When attackers
want to attack a particular instruction, glitching becomes difficult. This is because when
pipeline is used, the CPU can decode the next instruction while current instruction is still
11

Figure 2.2: Attack classification summary [41]

Figure 2.3: General Idea
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in execution process increasing the system performance, saving time for fetching the
next instruction.
The efficiency of the glitching device, which is measured by the amount of successful
faults injected is of prime importance, as any delay during the fault injection procedure
could result in missing the instruction and attacking either the previous or the next one.
Moreover, whether having a pipeline in the IC architecture exists is a disadvantage in the
purview of the attacker. The basic theme behind high speed clock-glitching is to insert
faults in the target device using short high-speed clock in the regular clock line.

2.4 Example

Figure 2.4: Types of clock glitching

An example of clock glitching is discussed in this section. Figure 2.4 represents
the example of overclocking and duty cycle change which are used as methods to inject
faults. In the Figure 2.4, standard clock pulse at which the system is manufactured for
is displayed. If this clock frequency is not tampered with, execution of instructions is
observed according to the program for which it was built or developed. There are also
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other parameters which can be tampered with to achieve similar results. The two types
which are displayed in the Figure are overclocking and duty-cycle change. In the case of
short overclock i.e., glitched clock frequency input produces multiple rising edges in
a single normal clock cycle, it results in irregular behavior of the device. During this
overclocked duration, the instruction will not execute correctly due to incorrect read from
memory. After this period, the next instructions would be executed. Similar outcome
would be observed during the duty-cycle change. Another observation could be the
program counter increasing but write-back of the instruction does not occur. Another
property of clock which can be varied is the phase-shift. Phase-shift, like duty cycle
can be modified to introduce temporary faults.
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW

Hardware Security research involving both attack and the prevention of hardware
attacks is currently a growing research area. As the latest technologies involve the use
of cutting-edge hardware design, the research in this field helps in developing products
which are secure against major fault attacks. Firstly, various fault injection mechanisms
have been tried & classified to generate fault models [8]. This provided insight, allowing
one to assess the effect of the attacks on devices. Literature review of research in the
field of clock glitch attacks shows that secure micro-controllers and digital electronics
like FPGA’s have been used as the target for experimentation [34]. Later on, experiments
were streamlined to generate results for each individual glitching mechanism. Research
in the domain of high speed clock glitching is in a nascent stage.
In this chapter, existing works in fault injection techniques have been described in
section 3.1, works related to high-frequency clock generation and clock glitching have
been discussed in section 3.2. Finally, cryptographic algorithm response to fault injection
and countermeasures to circumvent the fault injection attacks have been reviewed in
section 3.3.

3.1 Works in Fault Injection
The authors of [46] give a good introduction about fault injection in general. Further,
the authors of [23] proposed to deal with generating a high speed clock glitch using an
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FPGA for evaluating fault injection attacks and its counter measures on cryptographic
modules. Fault injection attacks are generally found in the fields of cryptographic
hardware and embedded systems where the attackers inject faults into the cryptographic
operations of the system where the secret key is computed from faulty cipher text
(patterns). After focusing on the public-key cryptosystem, the authors further delve
into the fault attacks injected in a symmetric-key cryptosystem. In order to evaluate the
possibility of such malicious attacks in practice, different fault injection techniques have
been investigated by the authors. These faults are roughly categorized into two types:
permanent faults and the transient faults.
In a permanent fault, the target-circuit is damaged, and it is easy to detect and react
to them using POST (power-on self-test). That is, when the target circuit is powered-on
after the fault, the device will most likely not respond due to the damage. In contrast, a
transient fault is induced during run-time. At the end of run-time, the target circuit can be
recovered to its initial state. Hence it is more difficult to detect the exact occurrence of
the fault. For both of the fault models, various injection techniques were described using
glitches on power, clock signals, higher frequencies, laser shots, lower voltages, light
illuminations on the surface of a depackaged chip. Among these techniques, a transient
fault induced by a glitch clock is one of the feasible faults due to the vulnerability to
invasion and lack of control.
The authors in [23] showed how to generate a clock glitch using an FPGA. The
proposed theory in this paper is based on the method initiated by the authors in [25],
where a temporal voltage is injected into the clock by switching between two clock
signals with the same frequency but with a difference in phase. When the clock source
is switched from one to the other a glitch clock cycle is observed. The authors then
identified the basic characteristics of the proposed generator which is implemented on
the Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO) platform [32]. As the
name suggests SASEBO was developed for performing security and evaluation against
various threats, primarily side-channel attacks.
The effectiveness of the proposed generator through safe error attack against RSA

16

crypto-processing was demonstrated, where the faults are tested with the corresponding
power traces instead of outputs, which resulted in successfully distinguishing between
normal and dummy operations. The main difference between the research in this thesis
and [23] is that, the authors in the above-mentioned paper have used constant Glitch
delay (Td) versus the parameter Glitch width (Tw) while experimenting on the target. The
experiments carried out in this thesis research were carried out based on varied parameter
values involving Glitch length and Glitch offset.
There have been results where the number of faults induced is directly related to
the frequency of the faster clock [12]. A similar mechanism has been executed with a
different non-invasive property, of voltage glitching, by the authors of [13]. This was
performed by undervolting an ARM processor during cryptographic operation.
Voltage glitching is chosen as an attack method for this research, and the paper
discusses a methodology that can be used to gain insight into micro-controller faults.
Generally glitching attacks can attain things that logically cannot be achieved in embedded
systems. It is important for many attacks to gain access to the code or obtain run-time
control before other attacks can be applied. In recent times, micro-controllers are designed
to protect the internal code. JTAG or boot-loader interfaces are used to access the code.
Glitching allows bypassing these features. Generally the power pin (Vcc), the reset pin
or the clock pin is targeted when these faults are being induced. The pins can be attacked
in a different ways like short voltage dips, short voltage spikes and prolonged voltage
dips. For this research, short voltage dips in the Vcc line are discussed. The faults were
categorized into memory and instruction faults where instruction faults encompasses
errors which may be introduced during the stages of instruction execution [43].

3.2 Works related to high-frequency clock generation &
clock glitching
High frequency clock generation can be via several methods like ring oscillator,
phase locked loop, voltage coupled oscillator coupled with PLL and clock frequency
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circuit or Crystal oscillators which are temperature compensated. These are few of the
choices to achieve high frequencies and the choice of which type to use depends on the
application for which it is being designed. Also, a stable high frequency yields reliable
results. To achieve stability in such high frequency clock certain additional circuitry is
employed. [42] describes a jitter removal circuit for frequencies ranging from 800 MHz
to 5 GHz.
One of the most important research contributions from the authors of [11] is the
characterization of of the effects of clock glitching on 8-bit Microcontroller units (MCUs).
The effects of clock glitch on the two-stage pipeline implemented by the chosen 8-bit
AVR MCUs has been described. These MCUs used were based on modified Harvard
architecture. Thereby both the data bus and instruction bus could be accessed in a single
clock cycle and resulted in a two-stage pipeline. As a result fault injection had multiple,
complex effects. The glitch period used was decreased from 125 ns (for which the target
functioned correctly) until 15 ns. Glitch period, Tg, is as shown in Figure 3.1. Their
work involved fixing the target device and fault induction mechanism. The analysis of
the faults’ outcome was found to be an arduous task due to the two-stage pipeline and
lack of access to the working of the MCU. The similarity between the research performed
in this thesis and [11] is that the analysis on the target devices has been carried out on
targets which had externally accessible clock line and in a black-box setting. That is,
access to the information publicly is available via data-sheets.

Figure 3.1: Glitch period illustration from [11]
The results obtained from this paper can be summarized into: faults in data flow and
program flow. When it came to single cycle instruction in data flow set of experimentation,
the authors observed that a short glitch timing could impact both the program flow and
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data flow. On the other hand, in a two cycle instruction, the same experiment resulted in
preventing the fetching of the next opcode and executing the same opcode twice. The
results related to data flow were observed to be stable for multi-cycle instructions related
to memory, example LD & LPM. Depending on the glitch period, the instruction loads
the last value that has been transferred to/from memory. Finally, multi-cycle instructions
were found to be most easy to glitch and it was concluded that these kinds of attacks can
be combined with known attacks to inject a single or multiple faults in a single execution.
The authors have thereby characterized their fault models as: The instructions could
be replaced rather than skipped. Reproducible and deterministic faults were observed on
data flow. More stale results for multi-cycle instructions were observed to be stuck-at-zero
and set word faults. By this the authors have shown that theoretical fault models are
possible to implement.
Works which are related to generating a reusable high-frequency clock are also
discussed in this section. Existing research was conducted by using multiple Digital Clock
Managers (DCM) [4] and switching between the clock output frequencies generated as
mentioned by the authors in [40]. There have been efforts in the open-source community
to make equipment for side-channel analysis and fault injection attacks available to the
general public.
The DCMs provide flexibility in choosing the parameters of the clock used [24]. The
authors in this work have demonstrated an embedded security analysis platform which
deals with a side-channel attack inclusive of analog capture hardware, target device,
capture software and analysis software. A synchronous capture method is used by the
hardware which reduces the required sample rate, data storage requirement and improving
the synchronization of traces. Synchronous capture mode is a sampling technique where
the device clock is synchronous to the sample clock. Beyond side-channel attacks, the
hardware also lends itself to glitch and fault attacks. A synchronous sampling technique
is used whose underlying objective is to measure data on the edges of the system clock.
Using two adjustable delay lines built into FPGA, a clock glitch module (present in the
system) can insert glitches into a target clock. The target clock here can either come
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from the device under test or generated by FPGA itself. Here, the glitch width can be
adjusted from about 3ns to 100ns and the offset from the clock edge from -50% to +50%
of the clock period. A partial reconfiguration interface is provided to allow adjustments
over a wider phase range. New attacks added to the system are simplified by the attack
module as the leakage model, cryptographic model and attack algorithm are separate.
The changes are simplified and re-usability is increased. When a new attack is added to
the system, it can use the existing cryptographic and leakage models and automatically
work with software and hardware.
Cryptanalysis is a research field which deals in the meaning of encrypted information
without any access of the secret information where only the “authorized parties” can
decrypt it. Cryptographic algorithms are studied for extracting information for constructing and analyzing protocols that overcome the influence of the attackers. In this paper,
the crypto analysis algorithms are based on clock violation and Meta stable condition
of flip flops. Here the FPGA test bed is used for injecting faults through clock glitches
and the UART acts as an interface which is used by the FPGA for controlling fault
injections. Clock frequencies are generated by the digital clock manager. A Digital
Clock Manager (DCM) solves common clocking issues especially in high performance
and high frequency applications. To synthesize a new clock frequency DCMs optionally
multiply or divide the incoming clock frequencies. The system performance is improved
by DCM as it eliminates the Clock Skew and Phase-Shifts. Special signal ’Clock’ is
used to implement logic level onto gates, flip-flops and store the values and evaluate the
function in the Register Transfer Level [24][40].

3.3 Countermeasures & Summary
As a protection mechanism there are several counter-measures which some target
devices have as inbuilt properties [27], [19]. One of the types of countermeasures can be
high-frequency clock detection. The main purpose of these counter-measures is to send
the device into lock-down mode if there is any external input which it cannot accept.
[35] describes a hash-based monitoring system which runs in parallel with the embedded
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processor to ensure safe processing. This monitoring system detects deviations from
normal functioning within a single clock cycle. There have also been new cryptographic
algorithm implementations and PIN based protection which are resistant to fault injection
attacks [28]. The authors of [51] described a novel design of AES implementation on
dual-rail chip which is clock-less. It was improvement over conventional AES design in
terms of resistance to power, timing and clock glitch attacks.
RSA-CRT algorithm has been implemented as an application on the target used in
the research carried out in this thesis. Previously, few authors have also considered
various implementations of RSA to check its performance against fault injection attacks
[38], [45], [18]. Common equipment used in most related research activities are measurement reading devices like a Pulse Generator, Oscillator, FPGA and a certain type
communication mode with Computer and the target.
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CHAPTER IV
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter describes the details of the experiment environment. Two different
target systems from Texas Instruments and STM, both of which are based on ARM
Cortex M4 processor core and have been used. Since the main subject of this thesis is
clock glitch attack, external hardware is used for the generation of higher speed clock
and controlled clock glitches to be sent to the target systems. Section 4.1 overviews the
complete setup of the test environment, which is followed by detailed descriptions of
each component.
Section 4.2 discusses target microprocessor systems - Tiva C Series Launchpad Evaluation Kit from Texas Instruments and Core 417I Development Board from Waveshare
Electronics. Microprocessors incorporated in the two targets are TI TM4C123GH6PM
and STM32F707IGT6, respectively. Section 4.3 discusses a detailed description of
clock generation and distribution in the two target systems. Section 4.2 explains test
programs executed during the test – RSA-CRT and for-loop with complex mathematical
expressions. These were chosen because simpler instructions would not be seriously
affected, as they complete their execution earlier in a given cycle (e.g., execution stage in
the pipelined architecture). Section 4.5 explains external hardware to provide controlled
clock glitches.
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4.1 Overview of Test Environment
This section describes the setup used for fault injection of the two target devices.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the outline of the entire test environment for the TM4C MCU
and STM32F MCU, respectively. The connections between various devices mentioned
has been described in more details in the following sections of this chapter.

4.1.1 Tiva C Series Launchpad (TM4C MCU)
Figure 4.1 shows the overall experiment environment. The following points describe
the individual components:
• A target system based on TM4C MCU is on the right in the figure.
• FPGA system, on the left, is configured to generate 25 MHz differential pair as
well as 33 MHz or 40 MHz overclock.
• The choice between the normal and the overclock is made depending on the
selection lines from VCGlitcher, shown at the bottom of the figure.
• This choice is triggered from the test program running on the target through GPIO
pins. In this test, Tiva C Series Launchpad is programmed to run RSA-CRT
Encryption and Decryption algorithm. The analysis using Inspector is shown in
Section 5.2.
• Clock glitch parameters are set up using Inspector running on the PC, as shown on
the bottom right.
• Inspector observes and records the outcome of the test program execution for further
analysis. Inspector recognizes the target as a composite device and communicates
via the virtual com port. Inspector is connected to the target device via Virtual
COM Port.
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Figure 4.1: Setup Outline for Tiva MCU

Figure 4.2: Setup Outline for STM32F MCU
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Table 4.1 summarizes software programs and additional equipment.
The target was interfaced with the Inspector testing platform in order to perform initial
Product name
VCGlitcher
PicoScope 5203
Lenovo Thinkpad
Inspector FI
TI Code Composer Studio
LM Flash Programmer

Description
Device to generate timed glitches
1GS/s oscilloscope
Workstation
Fault injection software tool
IDE
Programmer software

Table 4.1: Setup Parameters for TM4C MCU Experimentation

measurements and analysis of the effect of fault injection. In the case of Tiva MCU,
Figure 4.3 depicts the setup used to run the experiments. The FPGA controls the clock
to be sent to the target, based on the GPIO triggering handled in the target. When the
selection line is left floating, then the default clock, which is 25 MHz is being generated.
When the selection line is grounded, then the higher speed clock which is either 33 or 40
MHz, is generated.

4.1.2 Core 417I Development Board (STM32F MCU)
Figure 4.2 shows the overall experiment environment for STM32F MCU. This is
similar to Figure 4.1 except the target system and FPGA configuration. In this case, it
uses three separate parts mainly to achieve higher speed than the setup in Figure 4.1 –
Clock generator, Clock manager (multiplier), and Multiplexer. Figure 4.3 shows the
actual experimental setup.
Table 4.2 summarizes software programs and additional equipment. First four are
the same as in Table 4.1.
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Figure 4.3: Clock Fault Injection Setup - Tiva Board with TI TM4C

Figure 4.4: STM32F417 Experimental Setup
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4.2 Test Targets
This section describes the two target microcomputer boards and the corresponding
target microprocessors, both of which are based on ARM Cortex M4 core architecture.
One important criteria behind the selection of a microcomputer board is accessibility of
clock line - externally, which enables the target board to be customized to work in bypass
mode, i.e., it uses external clock instead of an internal clock. This feature is important for
this work because it allows us to manipulate the clock input and to insert clock glitches
in a controlled manner (glitch offset, glitch duration, etc.). Firstly, in this section the
description of the ARM Cortex M4 core is provided, followed by the description of the
two microprocessors and the two target microcomputers.

4.2.1 ARM Core Microprocessors
ARM Cortex M4 core is a 32- bit RISC microprocessor [10]. Features of this core
that are relevant to this study are:
• Cortex-M4 implements the ARMv7E-M architecture
• Only Thumb and Thumb-2 instructions, or the subsets are supported in Cortex-M
architectures; the legacy 32-bit ARM instruction set is not supported
• Hardware multiply and hardware divide take 1 and 2~12 cycles, respectively
• It implements Harvard architecture, i.e., separate instruction bus and data bus
• It implements 3-stage pipeline with branch speculation
• It adds DSP instructions and an optional single-precision floating-point unit, which
is known as Cortex-M4F, which the two target microprocessors employ.
The main advantage of ARM based cores are power efficiency and cost-effective features
to develop high-speed devices. It is noted that the ARM Core has no specification for
Flash interface. That is, it depends on the IC manufacturer which use the ARM Core
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to either include or exclude the connection to the Instruction Bus. The Code, SRAM,
and external RAM regions can hold the program code. However, it is recommended that
programs always use the Code region because the Cortex-M4F has separate buses that
can perform instruction fetches and data accesses simultaneously (Harvard architecture).
The Cortex-M4F prefetches instructions ahead of execution and speculatively prefetches
from branch target addresses.

4.2.2 TI Tiva C Series Launchpad Evaluation Kit - TM4C[7]:
Texas Instruments develop and manufacture the microprocessors based on ARM
Cortex M4F core, which is called TM4C, more specifically, TM4C123GH6PM [7]. The
corresponding evaluation board is Tiva C Series Launchpad. It is an inexpensive (less
than $15), self-contained, single-board micro-controller, about the size of a credit card,
directly competing with Arduino board with four times faster speed. It offers a wide
range of peripherals, including motion control PWMs, 1-MSPS ADCs, eight UARTs,
four SPIs, four I2Cs, USB H/D/OTG, and up to 27 timers.
TM4C microcontroller includes 256KB Flash, 32KB RAM and 2-KB EEPROM.
It does not have the cache capability. Therefore, there exists a set of memory region
attributes which have to be followed for programming the MPU. Shareability and cache
policy attributes do not make any impact on the system behavior. However, usage of
these settings for MPU regions makes the application code portable.

4.2.3 STM32F Development Board - STM32F417IGT6[5]:
The distinguishing characteristic about the IC STM32F417IGT6 is that it embeds
a cryptographic accelerator. This cryptographic accelerator provides a set of hardware
acceleration for the advanced cryptographic algorithms usually needed to provide confidentiality, authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation when exchanging messages
with a peer. These algorithms consists of AES 128, 192, 256; Triple DES, HASH (MD5,
SHA-1), and HMAC. Additionally, it has a TRNG (True random number generator)
based on ring oscillators, and has a flash controller that could be used for simulating
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secure boot. It has 1MB of internal flash memory and 192Kb SRAM.
STM32F4 does not have processor cache. According to [5], there exists an ART
accelerator cache (Adaptive real-time memory accelerator or ART Accelerator) which
is connected to Flash array of size 1MB. The main purpose of the ART accelerator is
to cache the lines which are frequently used. The other purpose of ART is to support
the slow Flash interface which needs waitstates. For a cache hit, instructions would be
delivered to the prefetch unit. On cache miss, it would take 5 clock cycles to fetch the
flash line.
The development board Core 417I (costs less than $30) is manufactured by Waveshare
Electronics with the IC STM32F417IGT6. It is ideal for starting application development
with STM32F family. As a minimal ready-to-run system, the Core417I integrates USB
communication interface, JTAG/SWD programming/debugging interface, clock circuit,
USB power management, boot mode selection, and so on.

4.3 Clock Generation and Distribution
4.3.1 TI Tiva C Series Launchpad Evaluation Board and TM4C
There are four clock sources for Tiva board as shown in Figure 4.4. This figure
provides detailed understanding about which clock source has to be used as input and
which clock signals are driven. The four clock sources are:
• Precision Internal Oscillator PISOC: The internal oscillator constitutes a16 MHz
crystal with a (+/-) 3% deviation. This is the main internal clock circuit of Tiva. It
contains an internal PLL which can be configured via software to multiply this
clock. This configured clock can be used for peripheral and core timing.
• Hibernation Module Clock Source: This module is clocked via an external 32.768
KHz crystal. Its main purpose is to provide real-time clock source to the system.
• Internal Oscillator (+/- 50%): The main purpose of this clock source is for deepsleep operation for power-saving modes.
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• Main Oscillator (MOSC): A frequency-accurate clock source by one of two means:
– External single-ended clock source supports frequencies from 4 MHz to 25 MHz
is connected to the OSC0 input pin
– External oscillator is connected across the OSC0 input and OSC1 output pins.

Figure 4.5: Clock Tree of Tiva MCU with highlighted external clock input

The highlighted section (Main OSC) shows the clock source which has been chosen as
input for our work of clock glitch. Board modifications have been made to accommodate
the external clock source. The modification was made in order to provide the clock
through pin 38, on the TM4C123GH6PM chip, which is by default fed from the oscillator.
Firstly, the wire on the PCB between OSCIN pin on the MCU and oscillator was cut
using a fiber-glass pen or a sharp cutter. Then, a thin wire was soldered to the oscillator
pad to use for connecting back to the OSCIN pin. In this way, the board was rendered
useful in both external clock and internal clock conditions to suit the requirement. The
exposed copper as shown in Figure 4.5 was then soldered to a thin microwire to use for
providing external clock. Since, the external clock source is directly provided to the pin
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in the MCU, the target boots with clock frequency which is provided on this pin. Certain
flags have to be set in software to bypass the PLL and provide this clock to the system
directly.

Figure 4.6: Board Modification for external clock input on Tiva Launchpad

4.3.2 Core 417I Development Board and STM32F417IGT6
Core 417I contains three main types of clocks sources to drive the system clock.
Figure 4.6 represents the clock tree for Core 417I. It provides detailed understanding
about which clock source has to be used as input and which clock signals are driven. The
main Cortex clock is denoted by ’HCLK to AHB bus, core, memory and DMA’ signal.
”SW” selector has to be set to HSE and set the AHB Prescaler to /1 to give to the core
the HSE clock as directly as possible.

The three types of clock sources can be switched on and off based upon the usage to
reduce power consumption. They are listed as follows:
• High-speed internal (HSI) clock: It is the default clock after reset and is rated
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Product name
VCGlitcher
PicoScope 5203
Lenovo Thinkpad
Inspector FI
CoIDE
Busblaster/ST-Link v2

Description
Device to generate timed glitches
1GS/s oscilloscope
Workstation
Fault injection software tool
IDE
Debugger/Programmer

Table 4.2: Setup Parameters for STM32F MCU Experimentation

Figure 4.7: Clock Tree of STM32F4 with highlighted external clock input
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at 16MHz. It’s mainly used for general purpose applications, wherein it can be
directly given as input to the system clock or as an input to the PLL.
• High-speed external (HSE) clock: It can be generated by two possible means:
– HSE external crystal/ceramic resonator: The main advantage of using this clock
source is that it is very reliable and accurate.
– HSE external user clock: This mode is called HSE bypass mode. This mode has
been used for the experiments performed on this target.
• PLL: This MCU contain two PLLs called main PLL and dedicated PLL (PLLI2S).
The main PLL configuration cannot be changed once the PLL is enabled. The
PLLs are disabled when HSE is used as system clock.
Core 417I Board also contains the following two secondary clocks:
• Low Speed Internal (LSI) clock: It is a 32 kHz low speed internal RC oscillator.
Its main purpose is for providing real-time clock and watchdog timer.
• Low Speed External (LSE) clock: It is a 32. 768 kHz external crystal which also
has the capability to drive the real-time clock.
On reset, the 16 MHz HIS (High speed Internal) is selected as the default CPU clock. The
application can then select as system clock either HSI or an external 4-26 MHz clock
source, which is called High speed external (HSE). Further, the external clock source can
be monitored for failure. If a failure is detected, the system automatically switches back
to HSI and a software interrupt is generated (if enabled). For the system clock generation,
STMicroelectronics has a software tool that will generate the required clock system file.
The maximum external clock input is rated at 50 MHz. If there is a problem with
the board clock configuration, it either does not boot, or boots but with a different clock
speed. This results in irregular behavior of the peripherals. For example, the USB port
which has a standard rating of 48 MHz, according to the datasheet, has to receive stable
clock input for proper communication to take place.
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For the clock generation system the following steps have to be followed for the
experiments performed in this research:
• PLL Prescalers have to be set.
• The flag to shift to HSE has to be set in RCC-CR register
• If the flag is set, the switch to HSE to take place
The Reset and Clock Control Register (RCC-CR) is used to switch on or off the on-chip
clock peripherals. According to the External source (HSE bypass) section in the Reference
Manual, it is explicitly mentioned that the external clock should be input via OSC_IN
pin [6]. By setting the HSEON bit in the RCC_CR register, the pins PH0 and PH1 have
been configured as OSC_IN and OSC_OUT respectively. The preliminary property
of PH0 and PH1 pins is GPIO functionality; but when the HSEON bit is set, the HSE
functionality has higher priority than GPIO.
Target hardware modifications to accommodate external clock:
• Board cutter or fiberglass pen was used to make a cut on the board between the
OSC_IN pin and resistor on the back side of the board.
• It was made sure that there was no sensitive material near the area to cut.
• Thin wire was soldered to the resistor pad and connected to the GPIO pin PH0.
• Cut between OSC_IN (where the external clock was provided) and the resistor,
add a microwire (thin wire) to the resistor side so it can be connected back later.

4.3.3 VCGlitcher
VCGlitcher is the Riscure’s proprietary device developed to inject voltage and clock
fault (selection device) [47], which is shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. It takes an input from
the target, which is the trigger for generating a Digital Glitch as selection signal. The
digital glitch indicates the time at which the clock multiplexer should send the respective
clock to the target.
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4.3.4 Inspector
Several parameters have to be tweaked and tested to generate an effective fault on the
respective target. Different targets might respond to a certain set of parameters differently.
One target example may give certain outcome to a parameter set, for which another
target example might not output any useful observation. The following provides the
list of parameters which constituted the various experiments. They are categorized as
time-dependent parameters and application specific parameters.
Time dependent parameters:
The parameters dependent on time are:
• Glitch Length - The duration of time for which the generated glitch remains in the
On condition. The glitch length should preferably be of small magnitude and within a
processor clock cycle; which is the amount of cycles of the chip from the start of its
operation. It is used to time the attack to target a specific instruction on the chip. It can
be set to a specific cycle or changed with each attack within specified boundaries.
• Wait Cycles - It is the number of clock cycles of the chip when initiated. This value
is used to time the attack at a particular duration from the start of operation of the chip.
This is a very affective parameter when the target is running a known program and the
time taken for a particular instruction to execute is known in advance.
• Glitch offset - The attack is offset from the initial clock cycle by a magnitude equal
to glitch offset. As frequency of different targets vary, this value has to be calibrated
based on that property. Also, this value has to remain within one clock cycle of the target
frequency.
Application speciﬁc parameters:
The other properties include those which are application dependent they are listed as
follows:
• Vcc Voltage - It is the voltage value of the Vcc line of the target device. This value
can be obtained from the amplitude of the clock cycle.
• Time to wait before the glitch
• Number of consecutive glitches in a single clock cycle
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• Number of consecutive clock cycles that contain a glitch
• Voltages of the glitch
• Glitch cycles - VCGlitcher is programmed to send glitches at constant intervals.
These intervals are defined by glitch cycles. This value is the number of times in an attack
the glitch is sent.

Figure 4.8: Inspector parameters [31]
Figure 4.8 illustrates the parameters being discussed in this section. When the target
runs known source code, the information analyzed by the execution of a sample set of
parameters can be used to choose certain parameters to make better impact on the target
process execution. An example of this is the time duration at which the glitch should
be generated. Inspector software logs the output from the target. This obtained output
values can be compared to expected output. When the comparison does not yield positive
result, that particular observation can be considered as a fault.

4.4 Test Programs
4.4.1 RSA-CRT on Tiva Board with TI TM4C
The test application programmed on TM4C MCU is RSA-CRT. RSA is a well-known
public-key cryptosystem employed in, for example, OpenSSL and .NET. Brief description
of the algorithm is as - For every message M, the algorithm creates a (Public, Private) key
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pair which are multiplicative inverses of each other. To send a message to Bob, message
has to be encrypted with Bob’s public key. Then, only Bob has the capability to decrypt it
using its private key. Multiplicative operations are computationally intensive operations.
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is an efficient way to compute the modulus
operations, since smaller exponents and modulus values are used to make 2 exponentiation
calculations at the risk of reduced security. The CRT implementation of RSA performs
its execution in three steps: reduction, exponentiation and recombination. To achieve
this, it needs a number of precomputed parameters. The total number of cycles consumed
for the operations in encryption and decryption functions has been approximated to 20M.
Figure 4.7 shows the code listing of RSA-CRT used in our experiment.

void r s a _ c r t _ d e c r y p t ( ) {
DIGIT_T m1 [ MAX_FIXED_DIGITS / 2 ] ;
DIGIT_T m2 [ MAX_FIXED_DIGITS / 2 ] ;
DIGIT_T h [ MAX_FIXED_DIGITS / 2 ] ;
DIGIT_T tmp [ MAX_FIXED_DIGITS ] ;
s i z e _ t max_len ;
/ / G e t t h e maximum n u m b e r o f d i g i t s f r o m
/ / p , q , dp , dq , q I n v , c i p h e r t e x t
max_len = m a x _ d i g i t s _ o f _ i n p u t ( ) ;
//

I n i t i a l i z e M to 0

m p S e t Z e r o ( m, MAX_FIXED_DIGITS / 2 ) ;
/ / T r i g g e r g o e s HIGH
set_trigger () ;
/ / m1 = c ^ dP mod p
mpModExp ( m1 , c , p r i v _ k e y . dp , p r i v _ k e y . p , m a x _ l e n ) ;
/ / m2 = c ^ dQ mod q
mpModExp ( m2 , c , p r i v _ k e y . dq , p r i v _ k e y . q , m a x _ l e n ) ;
/ / t m p = m1 + p − m2
mpAdd ( tmp , m1 , p r i v _ k e y . p , m a x _ l e n ) ;
m p S u b t r a c t ( tmp , tmp , m2 , m a x _ l e n ) ;
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/ / h = t m p * q I n v mod p
mpModMult ( h , tmp , p r i v _ k e y . q I n v , p r i v _ k e y . p , m a x _ l e n ) ;
/ / blink_led () ;

/ / tmp = q * h

m p M u l t i p l y ( tmp , p r i v _ k e y . q , h , m a x _ l e n ) ;
/ / c l e a r _ t e x t = t m p + m2
mpAdd ( m, m2 , tmp , m a x _ l e n ) ;
/ / T r i g g e r g o e s LOW
clear_trigger () ;
}

As shown in Figure 4.1, Riscure’s proprietary Fault Injection and Side Channel
Analysis test environment, Inspector 4.7 and 4.8 have been used for the experiments
performed [31]. The main purpose of the Inspector is to set the parameters and configuration required for the test environment, as well as receive the output response from
the target. The advantage with Inspector is that experimentation can be automated.
This will directly result in carrying out several experimental observations with minimal
interference. When TM4C runs RSA-CRT, the decrypted text is being observed on
Inspector. Inspector Protocol is set to recognize and compare the first few bytes sent
from the “rsa_crt_decrypt” function which is shown in 4.4.1 program listing. After
the comparison, each response will be color coded into green, yellow or red based on
protocol with which it is being programmed. When the decrypted response is the same as
expected it will be marked green. Similarly for glitched or faulty response, red color will
be logged. Sometimes, due to external disturbances in the setup or device being unable
to respond, yellow response will be recorded. After completion of the experimentation
the glitched responses which are in red can be used for carrying out fault analysis to
retrieve the keys and obtain more information about the algorithm key or leakage. Due
to limited time availability cryptanalysis has not been carried for the responses obtained
in this research.
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4.4.2 For loop
The test application programmed on STM32F MCU is for-loop, which counts up
after performing certain set of math instructions. The code used is as shown in 4.4.2
program listing. The final counter value (which is a) is being observed on Inspector.
Inspector Protocol is set to recognize and compare the final counter value sent from
the for loop function performed on the STM32F MCU to the actual expected count
value. The total number of cycles consumed for each iteration of the operations inside
the for-loop used in the program has been approximated to 130. Most of these cycles are
consumed by the complex math operations which use the Floating Point Unit
calculations.

f o r ( c o u n t e r = 0 ; c o u n t e r < 1 0 0 ; c o u n t e r + +)
{
c a l c = a s i n f ( num1 ) * 1 8 0 . 0 / P I ;
calc = calc / 2 . 0 ;
c a l c = c a l c * PI / 1 8 0 . 0 ;
calc = tanf ( calc ) ;
calc = calc / sqrt (3) ;
calc = calc * 6.0 + 9 . 9 ;
a + + ; / / V a r i a b l e c o u n t i n g up
}

Again, as shown in Figure 4.2 and explained in Section 4.4.1, Inspector 4.7 and
4.8 have been used for the experiments performed [31] while STM32F MCU runs the
for-loop program.

4.5 Additional Hardware
This section describes the additional hardware to achieve clock glitch attack. Each
component is inter-dependent on each other based on the connections mentioned in
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Figure 4.1.

FPGA - Digilent Nexys 3
As shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the FPGA board called Digilent Nexys 3 equipped
with Spartan-6 FPGA is used as the main source of clock generation for the experiments
performed in this research. Figure 4.9 shows the Nexys 3 FPGA with the DCM clock
outputs connections, from the pmod pins.
• For the TM4C MCU setup, the FPGA controls the clock which is input to the
target based on the trigger received via the pmod pins.
• For the STM32F MCU setup, FPGA controls the clock, which is input to the
clock multiplier as well as the target. It is programmed with Microwire protocol to
send the registers required to configure the output clock from the clock multiplier.
Microwire is a full-duplex protocol, similar to SPI protocol, but for the implementation in this research, only half-duplex protocol was designed, as the registers
have to set for programming. Further details about the microwire protocol are
discussed later in this chapter.
• The generation of these clocks was performed by the usage of Digital Clock
Manager (DCM) which is the Xilinx proprietary IP [4], as shown in Figures 4.1
and 4.2. The main advantage of using DCM is the capability to control the phase
shift, duty cycle and delay of the generated clock output. The Spartan-6 FPGA has
four DCMs which is used in the TM4C experiment but not in STM32F experiment
due to the requirement of a higher speed.

• In case of TM4C experiment, the FPGA is configured to generate 25 MHz differential clock pair and also provide 33 MHz or 40 MHz depending on the selection
lines from VCGlicher.
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• In case of STM32F experiment, the FPGA is configured to generate 50 MHz
differential clock pair as output from two pmod pins. This clock was given as
input to the clock multiplier. Then, the configuration registers of clock multiplier
are programmed via EPP protocol from three dedicated pmod pins of FPGA. This
register configuration is customizable to generate the required i.e. multiplied or
divided clock output frequencies as output from the clock multiplier. Similarly,
different set of registers were programmed for experimentation. Firstly, basic
overclocking from 50 MHZ to 81 MHz for a short duration was considered. Then,
the higher end of this range was increased to 120 MHz and 300 MHz. The clock
multiplier generates 4 clock outputs which are fed as inputs to the high speed
multiplexer. Selection line is sent from VCGlitcher as digital glitch. The final
clock is taken from the clock multiplexer output and given as input to the target
which is STM32F MCU. 1

Clock Multiplier IC - LMK04033
For achieving a high-frequency, clock various trials have been carried out through
existing equipment such as the FPGA/Digital Clock Manager, but the frequency was
limited. Since, generating a stable high frequency is the task, the Texas Instruments
LMK04033 clock jitter cleaner IC was selected for experimentation. This IC is a lownoise clock jitter cleaner with cascaded PLLs. This IC takes in a valid signal of a certain
frequency as input through the OSCin pin [3]. The existing FPGA setup described in
section 4.5 can generate this required stable input clock. Figure 4.10 illustrates the
basic connection diagram of this clock multiplier IC. The initial test of LMK04033 IC
after implementing the connections was to observe 81 MHz at the output of Clkout2 on
power-up. This is the default state.

The main feature of this clock IC is that it can generate up to 5 multiplied/divided
1 One

of the main problems observed with the FPGA Board has been with the USB controller. The
experimentation associated with this research involved programming the FPGA several times via
the USB PROG port. This resulted in corruption of the USB controller. Reprogramming the USB
controller
using
the
DigilentFX2Repair
tool
solved
the
problem.
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clock outputs of various voltage levels after providing the required clock input [48].
These clock outputs are to be programmed via 15 registers using Microwire protocol into
the pins 4, 5, 6 of the IC which correspond to CLKuWire, DATAuWire, LEuWire. This
can be executed by either using CodeLoader4 software provided by Texas Instruments or
by emulating Microwire protocol on the FPGA to load the register values from the pmod
pins of FPGA. Texas Instruments also provides Clock Design Tool which is a simulator
for testing the clock and other parameters like PLL, VCO and Loop filter settings for
various Texas Instruments IC’s.

2

The CLKin pin was driven by a single-ended reference clock source from the FPGA.
Which is either a sinewave or LVCMOS/LVTTL voltage value. AC Coupling was used
in terminating the connections on the breadboard. Figure 4.11 shows the microwire clock
synchronized register programming. The blue wave represents the microwire clock. Red
wave represents the data being latched on the falling edge of microwire clock.

3

High Speed Differential Multiplexer - SY58029U
The main advantage of using SY58029U High-speed multiplexer is that it has the
high precision capability to select between multiple inputs with minimal crosstalk and
very low jitter [1]. Two inputs have used for experimentation as clock inputs. The output
of the multiplexer outputs the clock which is selected by the VCGlitcher, which serves
the selection line.

Figure 4.12 represents the Multiplexer IC as connected during breadboard prototype.
Inputs 0 and 2 were used and switching between them was by using the selection line 0
2 The

falling edge of slow clock/microwire clock should be used to update/shift the data. Registers were
programmed on each falling edge of CLKuWire signal. Register programming information on the
DATAuWire is clocked into a shift register on rising edge of the signal. Each register is sent from shift
register to the respective address. After programming is completed, all signals return to low state. The
EPP protocol programmed on the FPGA has been used to program the registers required to configure
the clock output of LMK04033 IC.
3 One of the main hindrance when working with this IC could be the impedance of the oscilloscope
probes. The 3 microwire lines should not be connected with oscilloscope probes. This was observed
during debugging stage. Verification of functionality of the register programming was not successful
and
the
reason
was
the
impedance
of
the
oscilloscope4.5
probes.
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which is controlled by VCGlitcher, the details about which are discussed in section 4.3.3.
Oscilloscope
Teledyne LeCroy Waverunner oscilloscope has been used to perform high frequency
and amplitude measurements.

The observations related to the experiments on the

STM32F417 were performed on the LeCroy. The bandwidth of the scope is vital in
measuring high frequency signals.
The PicoScope 5200 series oscilloscope [44] is used to carry out internal debugging
and register send and read observations from the FPGA to the LMK04033 Clock
Multiplier. Also, the impedance of the probes used was suitable only for a certain
range of observations. In this case, the experiments performed with the Tiva C were
observed using PicoScope. The attenuation curve of PicoScope is limited to 250-300
MHz.
External power supply
The Clock Multiplier and High-speed Multiplexer have been connected to separate
external power supplies to provide 3V3 supply. The main purpose of using separate
external power supplies is that there are chances of overheating the circuitry if only one
power supply is provided.
By the provision of these external power supply, whenever the current reaches a
certain limit, the voltage can be limited for the respective IC. If it was connected to
the same power supply, chances are high for both overheating as well as ground plane
interference. The external power was manually configured and provides coarse and fine
tuning control. The power supply and connections have been shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.9: Nexys 3 Spartan-6 FPGA Board
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Figure 4.10: LMK04033 Clock Multiplier basic circuit connection with highlighted
parts which have been described in section 4.5

Figure 4.11: Microwire Register programming
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Figure 4.12: SY58029U Differential LVPECL 4:1 MUX
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CHAPTER V
PERFORMANCE STUDY

This chapter explains the parameters related to the test environment and how these
parameters were used in the analysis of the results. Section 5.1 discusses the influence
of clock glitches on the target microprocessor systems. Section 5.2 explains test results
obtained from the clock glitching on the programs executed during the test – RSA-CRT
and for-loop with complex mathematical expressions.

5.1 Influence of Clock Glitches
The effect of different switching frequencies which can be generated from the setup
as shown in section 5.2 have been discussed in the following sections.

5.1.1 Measuring the influence of glitch on TI Tiva C
The following Figure 5.1 shows the change in clock frequency from 25 to 33 MHz
after the trigger being received. The base frequency (25 MHz) is observed on the left
hand side of the figure and after the trigger is observed the frequency shifts to the higher
33 MHz which has been illustrated on the right side of the figure. The frequency graph is
measured with voltage (V) on the Y-axis and time in micro-seconds (ms) on the X-axis.
The generic aspects of the analysis are described as follows: Overclocking from
25Mhz to 33Mhz yielded distinguishable results when compared to the other overclock
frequency of 40 MHz. Various glitch offset ranges have been experimented with and
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Glitch Offset Range - 1.7s to 2.2s was the setting which showed a maximum number
of affected glitches. This glitch offset was set to the duration where the processor is
performing the RSA decryption which has been described in Section 4.4.1.
Measuring device response/decryption
The following individual stages have been completed on the Micro-controller during
the experimentation process: MCU GPIO pin triggering waits until the decryption
function has been completed to pull low. For the Tiva, the reset pin is active low and
has to be pulled to the GND. The raw perturbation setting, which selects the required
parameters to check the response to glitching was setup. Table 5.1 shows the statistics of
the attacks on Tiva MCU. The table compares the glitch response observation during the
experiments performed for both the frequencies used. First column in the table shows
the various clock frequencies used to glitch the target. Second column is sub-divided
into two categories of observations, i.e., glitched or reset. The glitched category is for
observations where Inspector software denoted a red in the response, i.e., when the output
obtained was not the same as expected. Third column displays the percentage of attempts
corresponding to each type of output.

Table 5.1: Statistics of the glitching attacks on Tiva MCU

5.1.2 Measuring the effectiveness of glitch on STM32F417
The following individual stages have been completed on the Micro-controller which
is similar to the experimentation described for Tiva MCU: The MCU GPIO pin triggering
waits until the for loop function has been completed to pull low. For the STM32F the
reset pin is active low and Reset test of the MCU board, the reset is active low and has to
be pulled to the GND. The raw perturbation setting which selects the required parameters
to check the response to glitching was setup.
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The following Figure 5.2 shows the change in clock frequency from 50 to 81 MHz
after the trigger being received. Table 5.2 shows the statistics of the attacks on STM32F.
First column in the table shows the various clock frequencies used to glitch the target.
Second column is sub-divided into two categories of observations, i.e., glitched or reset.
Third column displays the percentage of attempts corresponding to each type of output.

Table 5.2: Statistics of the glitching attacks on STM32F MCU

5.2 Test Results
5.2.1 Tiva Board (TM4C MCU)
Several series of experiments resulted in the following observations. To verify
the communication challenge and response Inspector software was used. An Inspector
protocol, which communicates with the MCU, with input length of 129 bytes and expected
output length of 128 bytes was setup. The additional 1 byte was only part of overhead
used by the protocol. Single ended external clock source range via pin 40 - OSCIN0
as given in data-sheet is 4 MHz to 25 MHz. Table 5.6 represents the communication
challenge and response from the target while performing the experiments. Figure 5.4
represents the output with variable glitch offset and glitch length. Here, Green denotes
that the data which was expected, i.e., decrypted output was obtained. Yellow means
either the data was unknown or mis-communication happened as a result lead to time out
and subsequent reset of the target. Red means the the data is not same as the expected
data, which implies the data is obtained as a result of a fault. Figure 5.3 details the
observation of clock glitching. The bar graph 5.3 with glitch offset (s) on the X-axis and
glitch amount on Y-axis i.e., number of experiments which yielded glitches, conveys the
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Figure 5.1: Clock Shift after Trigger

Figure 5.2: Clock shift from 50 MHz to 81 MHz
50

information that majority of the glitches were observed at a certain range of glitch offsets,
more precisely in the glitch offset range of 1.6 to 2.0 seconds. This is an indication of
the certain computation during the RSA-CRT decryption function being glitched. The
different parts in the graph as represented in the legend are Normal (green), Glitched
(red) and Inconclusive (yellow) according to Inspector software.

Figure 5.3: Observation of number of glitches at corresponding glitch offset for Tiva
MCU at 33 MHz overclock

Figure 5.4: Plot of Inspector Output data Observation with variable glitch offset for Tiva
MCU at 33 MHz overclock
The plot in 5.4 displays the results obtained from table B.2 from the Appendix. The
observation made after successful glitching, as shown in Figure 5.6 is that feeding a
clock greater than 40 MHz mutes the board. The red line shows when the target did not
communicate the expected response. This required a hard reset by toggling the switch.
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Figure 5.5: Plot of Inspector Output data Observation with constant glitch offset and
constant glitch length of 200 ns for Tiva MCU at 33 MHz overclock

Figure 5.6: Inspector output showing the data obtained for Tiva MCU experimentation
for the corresponding Glitch Offset and Glitch Length values
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Figure 5.5 represents the output with constant glitch offset and glitch length. The
observation made from this condition was that, even though the glitch offset parameters
were left constant, the output obtained differed between yellow (inconclusive) or glitched
(red). From the Figure 5.6 few iterations of test gave unknown state as output (which is in
yellow). An iteration where the data was glitched was obtained, as shown with the data
in red, which means that the response from the target was not what was expected. The
following Parameter details in table 5.3 describes the most effective parameters which
yielded the glitch on the target.

1

Parameter
Total attempts
Glitch Offset Range
Supply voltage
Glitch length

Values
1000+
1,700,000,000ns to 2,200,000,000ns
3.3V
Random between 4ns and 1000ns

Table 5.3: Parameter details

Figure 5.7: Blank plot of Inspector Output data Observation with variable glitch offset
for Tiva MCU at 40 MHz overclock. Since, the target device was not responding at this
frequency. The board had to be reset after a certain timeout. As a result, there was no
communication observed.
Lastly, at an overclock of 40 MHz there was no communication observed. This is
shown in the Figure 5.7. The RSA-CRT Decryption takes around 2.8 seconds to complete.
The glitch was offset towards the closing end, which was glitch offset in the range of
1.7s to 2.2s, of this process as that is when decryption is being handled by the processor.
1

Due to time and resource constraints Differential Fault Analysis [2] on the RSA-CRT decryption
results obtained has not been performed. Differential Fault Analysis is the method of obtaining
keys by comparison between the results from the target with the fault injected and without.

53

The process involved pulling a trigger (GPIO pin) high and then the decryption process
which was followed by clearing the trigger. The parameters discussed in Section 4.3.4
have been tailored for Tiva MCU and tabulated in Table 5.3.

5.2.2 Core 417I Board (STM32F MCU)
Various ranges of clock was considered for the STM32F417 MCU. The base clock
was kept at 50 MHz and a short overclock was made to 81 MHz, 120 MHz, 300 MHz.
The duration for which overclocked clock frequency was active, which is defined as
glitch length, was set to a random value in 4-1000 ns range. Figure B.5 in Section B is
the default clock configuration of 50 MHz and 81 MHz when the glitch setup or trigger
has not been initialized.
Most observable results were in the range of 50-81 MHz. The values which are
shown and compared in the following plots are represented in hexadecimal values. The
program on the target was made to return the counter value of 100 which in hexadecimal
is 0x64. The values 0xC4, 0xCC which were received from the UART communication
could be classified as garbage values or maybe due to a corruption in the output buffer
of communication. The reason behind it is due to change in the communication baud
rate to an unknown value which the software on the computer is not able to recognize,
during the overclock. The change in baud rate resulted in receiving the value sent back
but unable to recognize as valid counter value. The main observation was that at 81MHz,
120 MHz to which it is overclocked the counter operation was corrupted and the glitched
outputs are shown in Table 5.8. The other observation was that at higher frequency of
300 MHz the system crashed and did not communicate. It required resetting the board
and starting the experiment over again.
The total time duration taken for the programmed application which involved sending
and receiving of a character after counting up in a for loop took around 1.5 seconds to
complete. The process involved pulling a trigger (GPIO pin) high and then the counting
up to 100 within a for loop which was followed by clearing the trigger. The glitch was
offset towards receiving end of this process as that is when, response from the counter
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will be received.

The bar graph 5.9 representing Normal or Glitched responses with glitch offset (ns)
on X-axis and glitch amount on Y-axis, conveys the information that majority of the
glitches were observed at lower glitch offsets than when compared to higher glitch offset.
Two different observations, with constant glitch offset and variable glitch glitch offset,
have been shown in Figures 5.10 and 5.11. The graph in Figure 5.10 displays the results
when the glitch offset parameters were set to constant at 582 ns for the overclock of 81
MHz. In this setting, it was observed that in glitch length range of 10-15 ns the counter
output was faulted to E4. Similarly, Figure 5.11 is the plot of the results obtained for
variable glitch offset at 120 MHz overclock. Comparatively higher number of faults
were obtained at lower glitch length ranges. The tables corresponding to the plots in this
section are presented in Section B of Appendix.
Lastly, at an overclock of 300 MHz there was no communication observed. The
target had to be reset after a time-out of no response. This is shown in the Figure 5.12.
There are several other observations during which the system does not respond back with
the correct expected output and has to be reset. The above plots have been chosen from
a range of experiments performed to show certain parameter settings had a considerable
impact on the target.
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Figure 5.8: Inspector log displaying response from STM32F417 MCU
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Figure 5.9: Observation of number of glitches at corresponding glitch offset for
STM32F MCU at 120 MHz (left) and 81 MHz (right) overclock

Figure 5.10: Plot of Inspector Output data Observation with constant glitch offset for
STM32F417 MCU at 81 MHz overclock

57

Figure 5.11: Plot of Inspector Output data Observation with variable glitch offset for
STM32F417 MCU at 120 MHz overclock

Figure 5.12: Blank plot of Inspector Output data Observation with variable glitch offset
for STM32F417 MCU at 300 MHz overclock. Since, the target device was not
responding at this frequency. The board had to be reset after a certain timeout. As a
result, there was no communication observed.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

6.1 Conclusions
The research presented in this paper was performed to introduce a new technique for
generating high speed clock glitching faults on target devices which are latest high speed
micro-controllers. The motivation for this research was to develop methodologies for
overclocking for clock fault injection, on which there are currently no publications. The
targets used were programmed for running test code to observe unexpected behavior to
faults. Both the targets returned output which was not expected around 20% of the test
time. The main features of the setup established are that - it is capable of performing
short overclocking up to a range of around 300 GHz as tested on the STM32F MCU.
In addition, the target clock can be successfully overclocked up to ~1GHz range as it
is the design capability of the clock multiplier used in this research. The existing setup
is also capable of performing duty cycle glitching as it is an inbuilt feature of the clock
multiplier or DCMs used in the setup.
This thesis developed a prototype system on the FPGA and external circuitry platform
with the collaboration of Inspector software. Experimental results verified the theoretical
analysis and displayed the basic functions of the clock glitching technique have been
successfully evaluated on the two target boards which have been chosen. The trade-off
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observed in this case was that more results were being observed at comparatively lower
speed switching frequencies, not at very high speed switching frequencies. The steps
involved in conducting high speed clock glitch fault injection with the required calibration
and operational settings on a cryptographic implementation and counter program on
micro-controllers have been presented.
In Chapter 4, it has been shown how the configuration of the setup has been designed
and built, through specific parameters, influencing the response from the target. Those
measurements were supported by specific communication challenge-response pairs used
to calculate the functioning of the processor. In Chapter 2, the background has been
discussed related to the clock glitching and fault injection techniques. Comparing the
results of attacks on the targets shown in frequency waveforms, we can clearly see that
short overclocks to very high frequencies were making the targets not send any data back.
The target needs to be reset. Most results were found in the 50-81MHz for the STM and
25-33MHz for the Tiva C. Therefore, concluding that even high-speed micro-controller
units should consider countermeasures against clock fault injection

6.2 Future Work
The experiments, in the research, were performed on the latest targets using a simple
loop test. This implementation has to be extended to a cryptographic algorithm on other
higher speed MCU or devices, and the effect of the high speed glitch has to be measured
on the same. The clock multiplier selected in this research has limited capability: up-to
~1 GHz. This can be a bottleneck when the targets run in GHz range, like certain
single-board computers or micro-controllers. Extensive research was performed to select
the clock multiplier used in this research. Further fine-tuning would involve selecting
a target which would function at a very high frequency and whose clock line can be
externally controlled. These devices function on the high speed clock, some of them even
greater than 1 GHz. A possible enhancement to extend this research would be to select a
clock multiplier with greater range. This type of clock multiplier can future-proof the
test setup for the required clock frequency range. The other options as targets include
60

Beaglebone Black with a 1 GHz processor or pcDuino3 - Development Board.
The prime importance has to be given to developing a printed circuit board design
implementing the external analog circuitry used in this research. This will lead to better
experimental observations in case of very high frequency clock settings. The PCB design
would provide flexibility in developing multiple test setup environments to attack more
targets at a given time.
Phased-synchronous mode is where the switch happens the next time a particular
phase is reached. For example, we can choose to switch at 75% of the normal clock
cycle if we know both normal and glitch clocks will be low (equal). Transient faults are
eliminated in this case. There is also an option to control the FPGA using the Inspector
tool. This would eliminate the use of VCGlitcher, as the wait cycles and glitch cycles can
be set directly on the FPGA pmod pins using the driver created in Inspector. It would also
be interesting to observe the response of targets on which countermeasures are enabled
for these types of high-speed clock glitch attacks.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
STM32F417 HSE Clock Bypass Conditions
Implementation

The SetSysClock call handles the clock conditions:
//In the PLL parameters
#define PLL_M 25
#define PLL_N 336
#define PLL_P 168
#define PLL_Q 14

//In the SetSysClock function
RCC->CR |= (uint32_t)(RCC_CR_HSEON | RCC_CR_HSEBYP);

In main.c
#define HSE_VALUE((uint 32_t)50000000)
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APPENDIX B
Output Observations

Figure B.1: LMK04033 generated 500 MHz clock

Figure B.1 shows the oscilloscope shot of clock generated from ClkOut2 pin on
the clock multiplier at 500 MHz frequency. This is just one of the possible high speed
frequencies which this IC can be configured to generate.

Figure B.2 is the accompanying observation in PC side as the microwire registers
are programmed one after the other4.11. It shows the EPP protocol sending the 8 bit
configuration

to

the

corresponding
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address

on

the

FPGA.

Parameter

Values

Input

02 00 80 12 53

Expected output

00 80 00 EB 7A

Unknown output

02 00 80

Glitched output

00 80 03

Parameter
Expected Output
Glitched outputs

Values
64
E4
C4
CC
Table B.1: Counter output observation from STM32F417 MCU Experiments

Table B.2: Output Observation

The following frequency graph in Figure B.6 shows the overclock to 120 MHz.
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Figure B.2: EPP protocol sending Microwire Protocol Registers

Figure B.3: Inspector log displaying response from STM32F417 MCU
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Figure B.4: Inspector log displaying response from STM32F417 MCU

Figure B.5: Normal condition clock observation (without glitch)
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Table B.3: Output Observation with constant glitch offset and glitch length

Table B.4: Counter program output data observation from STM32F MCU Experiments
at 81 MHz overclock
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Table B.5: Successful fault injections

Figure B.6: Clock glitch frequency Observation from LeCroy
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